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f i n a n c i a l l y t o l e r a t e t h e l a y o f f b e t t e r t h a n some of t h e younger 
d e p a r t m e n t e m p l o y e e s w i t h f a m i l i e s and t h a t C o l l o m h a d h e a r d 
T h u r s t o n p r e v i o u s l y s t a t e t h a t T h u r s t o n c o u l d a l w a y s o b t a i n work 
w i t h h i s f o r m e r e m p l o y e r . ( R e c . a t 9 2 - 9 3 , Bd . A p p . T r . ) 
T h u r s t o n a s k e d C o l l o m i f h e h a d b e e n s e l e c t e d b e c a u s e o f 
u n a c c e p t a b l e job p e r f o r m a n c e t o which Col lom r e p l i e d " N o " . ( R e c . 
a t 9 2 - 9 3 , Bd. App. T r . ; Rec . a t 6 1 - 6 3 , T h u r s t o n Aff. - 1(3). 
T h u r s t o n met a g a i n w i th Collom b e f o r e t h e b e g i n n i n g of t h e 
s c h e d u l e d Monday , December 19 , 1990 work d a y . T h u r s t o n a g a i n 
q u e r i e d C o l l o m a b o u t why he had b e e n s e l e c t e d h im f o r t h e RIF 
a c t i o n . ( R e c . a t 9 3 - 9 4 , Bd. App. T r . ; Rec . a t 50 , T h u r s t o n Aff. 
- 1(10). For t h e f i r s t t i m e , C o l l o m i d e n t i f i e d i n f r a c t i o n l e v e l 
j o b p e r f o r m a n c e i n c l u d i n g i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n . Collom s p e c i f i c a l l y 
i s o l a t e d a f e n c i n g p r o j e c t i n w h i c h p l a i n t i f f had p a r t i c i p a t e d 
a p p r o x i m a t e l y two w e e k s e a r l i e r a n d a c o u n t y r o a d c u l v e r t 
i n s t a l l a t i o n p r o j e c t w h i c h T h u r s t o n had s u p e r v i s e d d u r i n g t h e 
summer of 1 9 8 8 . ( R e c . a t 9 3 - 9 5 , B d . A p p . T r . ; R e c . a t 5 0 , 
T h u r s t o n Aff. - 1(10). C o l l o m ' s December 19, 1988 s t a t e m e n t s w e r e 
t h e f i r s t t i m e C o l l o m h a d e x p r e s s e d d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h 
T h u r s t o n ' s job p e r f o r m a n c e f o r any r e a s o n . ( R e c . a t 9 3 - 1 0 1 , Bd . 
A p p . T r . ) Two e m p l o y e e s i n a d d i t i o n t o T h u r s t o n were s e p a r a t e d 
from t h e i r road d e p a r t m e n t employment - a p a r t t i m e e m p l o y e e who 
had r e c e n t l y b e e n h i r e d and a s i x y e a r e m p l o y e e . ( R e c . a t 9 6 , 
Bd. App. T r . ) 
T h u r s t o n a p p e a l e d h i s e m p l o y m e n t t e r m i n a t i o n u n d e r t h e 
g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s of t h e Manual . H i s g r i e v a n c e was d e n i e d a t 
t h e f i r s t l e v e l o f r e v i e w on J a n u a r y 1 3 , 1989 by t h e C o u n t y 
C o m m i s s i o n e r a s s i g n e d t o r e v i e w t h e g r i e v a n c e . ( R e c . a t 1 4 4 , 
T h u r s t o n P e r s o n n e l F i l e ) . T h u r s t o n ' s g r i e v a n c e was t h e r e a f t e r 
hea rd b e f o r e t h e Box E l d e r C o u n t y B o a r d of A p p e a l s on March 1 3 , 
1 9 8 9 . T h e B o a r d ' s m e m b e r s h i p c o n s i s t e d o f t w o C o u n t y 
Commiss ioners and a c o u n t y employee s e l e c t e d by T h u r s t o n . ( R e c . 
a t 1 4 1 , T h u r s t o n P e r s o n n e l F i l e ) . The Board of Appeals h e a r i n g 
was a t t e n d e d by T h u r s t o n , h i s r e t a i n e d a t t o r n e y of r e c o r d , and 
t h e Box E l d e r C o u n t y A t t o r n e y . ( R e c . a t 8 5 , Bd. App. T r . ) The 
B o a r d r e c e i v e d s w o r n w i t n e s s t e s t i m o n y f r o m T h u r s t o n a n d 
Col lom and r e c e i v e d i n t o e v i d e n c e T h u r s t o n ' s p e r s o n n e l f i l e a s i t 
then e x i s t e d . ( R e c . a t 8 5 - 1 1 8 , Bd . App . T r . ; R e c . a t 1 1 9 - 1 6 1 , 
T h u r s t o n P e r s o n n e l F i l e ) . Collom t e s t i f i e d t h a t he had s e l e c t e d 
T h u r s t o n f o r R I F , i n p a r t , b e c a u s e o f n i n e p r o j e c t s w h e r e 
T h u r s t o n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e had b e e n u n a c c e p t a b l e . ( R e c . a t 
1 0 4 - 1 1 1 , B d . A p p . T r . ) C o l l o m a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t t h e n i n e 
o c c a s i o n s c i t e d by him s p a n n e d an a p p r o x i m a t e f i v e y e a r p e r i o d 
p r i o r to T h u r s t o n ' s December 30, 1988 s e p a r a t i o n . ( R e c . a t 1 1 1 , 
B d . A p p . T r . ) T h u r s t o n ' s t e s t i m o n y a n d t h a t of C o l l o m ' s 
conf i rmed t h a t a t l e a s t f ou r of t h e n i n e job a s s i g n m e n t s o c c u r r e d 
a f t e r t h e M a n u a l ' s A p r i l 2 6 , 1988 e n a c t m e n t . ( R e c . a t 9 8 - 1 0 2 , 
1 0 4 - 1 1 0 , B d . A p p . T r . ) C o l l o m n e v e r i n v o k e d t h e M a n u a l ' s 
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n p r o c e d u r e s ( o r a l d i s c u s s i o n , w r i t t e n 
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r e p r i m a n d s , s u s p e n s i o n , d e m o t i o n a n d t e r m i n a t i o n ) a g a i n s t 
T h u r s t o n on t h e r a t i o n a l e t h a t T h u r s t o n had b e e n t h e c o u n t y r o a d 
s u p e r v i s o r p r i o r t o December , 1983 and Thur s ton s h o u l d have known 
w h e t h e r t h e f o u r p r o j e c t s had been comple t ed c o r r e c t l y . ( R e c . a t 
1 0 4 , Bd . A p p . T r . ) The B o a r d i s s u e d a March 1 5 , 1989 d e c i s i o n 
s u s t a i n i n g T h u r s t o n ' s d i s m i s s a l on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t t h e C o u n t y 
had f u l l y c o m p l i e d w i t h t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s . The 
d e c i s i o n i n c l u d e d a d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n from t h e c o u n t y e m p l o y e e 
a p p o i n t e d a s t h e t h i r d member of t h e B o a r d . ( R e c . a t 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 , 
T h u r s t o n P e r s o n n e l F i l e ) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I 
The C o u n t y a g r e e s t h a t C o u n t y Road S u p e r v i s o r C o l l o m 
s e l e c t e d T h u r s t o n f o r s e p a r a t i o n u n d e r t h e C o u n t y ' s RIF a c t i o n 
f o r r e a s o n s o t h e r t h a n o r a t l e a s t i n a d d i t i o n t o " l e n g t h of 
s e r v i c e a n d / o r i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e " . The County c i t e s S t e w a r t 
v . C h e v r o n C h e m i c a l C o m p a n y , 111 Wash .2d 6 0 9 , 762 P . 2d 1143 
( 1 9 8 8 ) f o r a u t h o r i t y t h a t t h e t e r m " c o n s i d e r a t i o n " w i t h i n t h e 
M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s a l l o w s t h e County t o weigh a l l f a c t o r s in 
making a RIF d e c i s i o n and i s n o t l i m i t e d t o j u s t s e n i o r i t y a n d / o r 
i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e . The County a r g u e s t h a t i t i s i m m a t e r i a l 
w h e t h e r Col lom c o n s i d e r e d o t h e r f a c t o r s i n a d d i t i o n t o s e n i o r i t y 
o r p e r f o r m a n c e i n s e l e c t i n g T h u r s t o n f o r d i s m i s s a l so l o n g a s he 
had one o f t h e s e f a c t o r s i n mind w h i l e m a k i n g h i s d e c i s i o n . 
_ o _ 
Thurston agrees with Stewart that the Manual's use of the term 
"consideration" allows the County to relatively weigh, without 
restriction, the factors of job seniority and job performance or 
to invoke one of these factors to the complete exclusion of the 
other. Thruston disagrees, however, that the Washington Supreme 
Court held that the term "consideration", by definition, allows 
the County to consider any factors other than "length of service 
and/or individual performance" in selecting an employee for RIF 
lay-off. The term "consideration" is neither a defined term nor 
is it used as a term of art within the Manual's RIF provisions. 
The usual and ordinary meaning of the verb "to consider" is "to 
reflect on . ..to think of...to judge...to classify". The term 
carries no connotation or meaning which supports the argument 
advanced by the County. The Manual's RIF provisions are not 
ambiguous and should be given their usual and ordinary meaning 
and effect. Collom acted in derogation of the Manual's RIF 
provisions by selecting Thurston for discharge because his 
consideration was not confined to the enumerated criteria of job 
seniority and job performance. 
II 
"Gross neglect of duty or refusal to comply with lawful 
instruction. . .", "insubordination" and "incompetency and 
inefficiency in the performance of job duties. . ." are each 
defined infractions under Section V of the Manual for which the 
_ Q _ 
D e p a r t m e n t H e a d h a s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t i m e l y i m p o s e 
d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n r a n g i n g from " o r a l d i s c u s s i o n s , w r i t t e n 
r e p r i m a n d s , s u s p e n s i o n , d e m o t i o n and t e r m i n a t i o n " . ( R e c . a t 
7 8 - 8 1 , M a n u a l ) . Co l lom, in p a r t , j u s t i f i e d T h u r s t o n ' s d i s m i s s a l 
by c i t i n g n i n e o c c a s i o n s o v e r an a p p r o x i m a t e f i v e y e a r t e rm where 
T h u r s t o n ' s " i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e " was d e f i c i e n t . F o u r of t h e s e 
o c c a s i o n s f a l l w i t h i n t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e 
M a n u a l . The s e v e r i t y o f C o l l o m ' s d e s c r i p t i o n s u n a v o i d a b l y 
i n v o k e d t h e M a n u a l ' s S e c t i o n V i n f r a c t i o n l a n g u a g e of " g r o s s 
n e g l e c t o f d u t y " , " i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n " , " i n c o m p e t e n c y " o r 
" i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s t o w o r k " . Co l lom n e v e r s u b j e c t e d Thur s ton t o 
d i s c i p l i n e f o r any o f t h e c i t e d o c c a s i o n s a t t h e t i m e e a c h 
o c c u r r e d . He m o r e o v e r never d i s c l o s e d t o T h u r s t o n t h a t a n y 
a s p e c t of T h u r s t o n ' s " i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e " was u n a c c e p t a b l e 
u n t i l T h u r s t o n q u e r i e d C o l l o m on December 16 and December 19 , 
1988 a b o u t why he had been s e l e c t e d f o r s e p a r a t i o n . 
T h e C o u n t y a r g u e s t h a t " i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e " 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s h a v e no 
a p p l i c a t i o n o r r e l e v a n c e t o t h e M a n u a l ' s d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n 
p r o v i s i o n s . T h u r s t o n m a i n t a i n s , h o w e v e r , t h a t " i n d i v i d u a l 
p e r f o r m a n c e " c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s 
m u s t b e d i r e c t l y t i e d t o t h e M a n u a l ' s d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n 
p r o v i s i o n s where t h e a l l e g e d q u a l i t y of an e m p l o y e e ' s S e c t i o n I I 
" i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e " a l s o c o n s t i t u t e s a d e f i n e d S e c t i o n V 
" i n f r a c t i o n " . C o l l o m ' s f a i l u r e t o d i s c i p l i n e T h u r s t o n a t t h e 
- 1 n_ 
t i m e of e a c h a l l e g e d i n f r a c t i o n and t o d e l a y a l l d i s c l o s u r e of 
c l a i m e d i n f r a c t i o n s u n t i l t h e d a t e o f T h u r s t o n ' s d i s c h a r g e 
n o t i f i c a t i o n , e f f e c t i v e l y d e p r i v e d T h u r s t o n of h i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e 
due p r o c e s s r i g h t t o p r o t e c t h i s employment i n t e r e s t s and r e c o r d 
under t h e M a n u a l ' s g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s . 
The a b s e n c e of any d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n r e c o r d s w i t h i n 
T h u r s t o n ' s o f f i c i a l p e r s o n n e l f i l e , t h e award t o him of s c h e d u l e d 
wage s t e p i n c r e a s e s a n d t h e a b s e n c e o f a n n u a l p e r f o r m a n c e 
a p p r a i s a l s i s o l a t i n g i n f r a c t i o n l e v e l p e r f o r m a n c e , s h o u l d 
p r e c l u d e t h e C o u n t y f r o m g o i n g b e h i n d T h u r s t o n ' s o f f i c i a l 
p e r s o n n e l f i l e , f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e , on December 19 , 1988 t o 
a f t e r - t h e - f a c t r a t i o n a l i z e t h a t a c o n t r o l l i n g r e a s o n f o r 
T h u r s t o n ' s s e l e c t i o n f o r t e r m i n a t i o n u n d e r t h e County o r d e r e d RIF 
a c t i o n was i n f r a c t i o n l e v e l job p e r f o r m a n c e . 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THURSTON'S EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE REDUCTION IN FORCE PROVISIONS OF THE COUNTY'S 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR THE REASON THAT 
THE COUNTY EXPRESSLY CONSIDERED CRITERIA BEYOND 
THURSTON'S LENGTH OF SERVICE AND INDIVIDUAL 
PERFORMANCE. 
The legal effect of the County's enacted April 26, 1988 
Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual ("The Manual") is 
described by the Washington Supreme Court in Thompson v. St. 
Regis Paper Co. , 685 P.2d108l (Wash.1984) as follows: 
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It would appear that employers expect, if not 
demand, that their employees abide by the policies 
expressed in an "Employee Manual". This may create 
an atmosphere where employees justifiably rely on the 
express policies and thus justifiably expect that the 
employers will do the same. Once an employer 
announces a specific policy or practice, especially 
in light of the fact that he expects to abide by the 
same, the employer may not treat its promises as 
illusory. 
. . . 
[I]f an employer, for whatever reason, creates an 
atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with 
promises of specific treatment in specific situations 
and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the 
job and not actively seek other employment, those 
promises are enforceable components of the employment 
relationship. We believe that by his unilateral 
objective manifestation of intent, the employer 
creates an expectation, and thus an obligation of 
treatment in accordance with those written promises. 
(685 P.2d at 1081). 
Berube v. Fashion Centre Ltd., 771 P. 2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 
confirms the application of rules of contract construction to 
define the the employment relationship. Section 11(F) of the 
Manual defines the County's RIF procedure as: 
When circumstances (such as lack of funds or lack 
of work) dictate that a reduction in force is needed, 
the Elected Official or Department Head shall lay off 
the necessary number of employees with consideration 
to the length of service and/or individual performance. 
(Rec. at 73-74, Manual) . 
The Manual's RIF language does not dictate any weighing formula 
between length of service or individual performance or that both 
factors be concurrently considered, however unequally. 
The Department Head is allowed to consider only length of service 
and individual performance (whether together or one to the 
exclusion of the other) in selecting employees for a RIF layoff. 
_1 O 
The Manual's RIF provisions (a) do not contemplate department 
reorganization or the elimination of specific job descriptions 
(lead foreman, truck driver, etc.) but only the reduction of the 
total number of employed personnel within a department and, (b) 
to accomplish this reduction, an employee's length of service 
and/or individual performance are the only enumerated criteria 
which the County can invoke. 
The County acknowledges that Thurston was selected for 
separation for reasons other than or in addition to job seniority 
and job performance. It cites Stewart v. Chevron Chemical 
Company, 111 Wash.2d 609, 762 P.2d 1143 (1988) for the 
proposition that the County was not limited to the enumerated 
criteria of seniority and performance in making a RIF decision 
but was entitled to weigh all factors. It argues that it is 
immaterial whether Collom considered other factors beyond those 
enumerated within Section II of the Manual so long as Collom had 
either or both length of service and individual performance in 
mind while making his decision. (Rec. at 169, County's Reply 
Memorandum). 
The holding in Stewart v. Chevron Chemical Company does 
not control this action, but the mechanics of the court's 
reasoning do have direct application. In Stewart, the plaintiff 
was terminated from employment by Chevron as part of a RIF action 
within which Chevron's Employee Manual provided that ". . .in 
determining the sequence of layoffs due to lack of work, 
-13-
consideration should be given to performance, experience and 
length of service". 762 P.2d at 1144. While the plaintiff had 
accrued the most employment seniority, he was nonetheless 
selected by Chevron for layoff because he had the lowest 
performance rating of the four employees selected for discharge. 
The plaintiff contended that Chevron had breached the RIF 
language within its policy manual because he was terminated from 
employment solely because of poor past performance as opposed to 
Chevron considering concurrently all three RIF factors - job 
performance, experience and seniority. The Washington Supreme 
Court held in relevent part: 
Chevron's layoff policy states only that management 
"should" consider performance, experience and length 
of service in determining the sequence of layoff. 
This does not create an obligation that Chevron will 
or must consider all three factors. "Should" may be 
interpreted as discretionary, indicating merely a 
recommendation or a preference. . . Throughout other 
portions of the manual, Chevron used the terms "shall", 
"will" and "must", but in the layoff provisions used 
"should" indicating Chevron intended that the provision 
be advisory . . . 
Furthermore, Chevron was only required to "consider" 
these factors; no relative weight or value is 
assigned to any of the criteria. Thus, even if 
Chevron had factored Stewart's length of service 
into its decision, it was not required to give 
that criterion more weight than performance or any 
weight whatsoever if management deemed it inadvisable 
to do so. Thus the wording of §380 does not set 
forth the specificity necessary to create a binding 
promise. 762 P.2d at 1145-1146. 
The placement of "consideration" within Section 11(F) of 
the RIF provisions of the County's Manual is nowhere qualified by 
the word "should". In no regard does Stewart hold that the term 
"consider", b£ its own definition, allowed Chevron to include in 
its deliberations factors beyond those enumerated in its manual. 
- i / i _ 
B l a c k ' s Law D i c t i o n a r y ( 4 t h E d . R e v . 1 9 6 8 ) g i v e s t h e 
d e f i n i t i o n of " c o n s i d e r " ; "To f i x t h e mind o n , w i t h a v i e w t o 
c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n ; t o e x a m i n e ; t o i n s p e c t " . W e b s t e r ' s Th i rd 
New I n t e r n a t i o n a l D i c t i o n a r y ( 1 9 8 6 ) d e f i n e s t h e v e r b " t o 
c o n s i d e r " a s " t o r e f l e c t on : t h i n k a b o u t w i t h a d e g r e e of c a r e o r 
c a u t i o n . . . " Synonyms a r e r e f l e c t , d e l i b e r a t e , p o n d e r . s e e , 
In Re W h i t e T p . S c h o o l D i s t r i c t , 150 A.2d 744 ( P a . 1930) (Va lue 
of s t a t u t o r y i t e m s c o n s i d e r e d i n a p p o r t i o n i n g s c h o o l d i s t r i c t ' s 
i n d e b t e d n e s s , t e s t i m o n y r e l a t i n g t h e r e t o , o t h e r m a t t e r s 
c o n s i d e r e d , and j u d g m e n t a r e w i t h i n c o u r t o f common p l e a s ' 
e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l ; " c o n s i d e r " m e a n i n g mere ly t o g i v e due w e i g h t 
t o e n u m e r a t e d i t e m s " ) , C a r r i g a n v . I l l i n o i s L i q u o r C o n t r o l 
C o m m i s s i o n , 19 I l l . A p p . 2 d 225 , 153 N.E .2d 473 (1958) ( " C o n s i d e r " 
w i t h i n s t a t u t e p r o v i d i n g t h a t L i q u o r Commission s h a l l r e c e i v e and 
c o n s i d e r a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g of d e c i s i o n w i t h i n twenty days 
from f i l i n g t h e r e o f m e a n s t h a t C o m m i s s i o n s h o u l d n o t o n l y 
c o n s i d e r i n s e n s e o f p o n d e r i n g o r on g i v i n g t h o u g h t t o o r 
w e i g h i n g p e t i t i o n b u t a l s o i n s e n s e t h a t i t s h o u l d j u d g e , 
a d j u d i c a t e o r d e c i d e t h e s ame . ) 
The t e r m " c o n s i d e r a t i o n " i s n e i t h e r a d e f i n e d term nor i s 
i t used a s a t e rm of a r t w i t h i n t h e RIF p r o v i s i o n s of t h e M a n u a l . 
The t e r m c a r r i e s no c o n n o t a t i o n o r meaning w i t h i n t h e c o n t e x t o r 
l a n g u a g e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s w h i c h 
s u p p o r t t h e C o u n t y ' s a r g u m e n t t h a t Collora was e n t i t l e d t o weigh 
a l l f a c t o r s i n m a k i n g h i s RIF d e c i s i o n and was n o t l i m i t e d t o 
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j u s t s e n i o r i t y a n d / o r i n d i v i d u a l pe r fo rmance so long as he had 
one of t h e s e f a c t o r s in mind w h i l e s e l e c t i n g T h u r s t o n f o r 
d i s m i s s a l . The County ' s argument ignores t o t a l l y the unambiguous 
language of the Manual 's RIF p r o v i s i o n s which l a n g u a g e s h o u l d be 
g iven i t s u s u a l and o r d i n a r y meaning and e f f e c t . The Manual ' s 
l a n g u a g e o b l i g a t e d Collom to " f i x h i s mind on, w i th a view to 
c a r e f u l e x a m i n a t i o n " , " t o e x a m i n e " , and " t o t h i n k about with a 
degree of ca re or c a u t i o n " T h u r s t o n ' s l e n g t h of s e r v i c e a n d / o r 
i n d i v i d u a l pe r fo rmance in de te rmin ing whether to s e l e c t Thurston 
for s e p a r a t i o n unde r the RIF a c t i o n . The term " c o n s i d e r a t i o n " 
d o e s n o t , by d e f i n i t i o n , a l l o w t h e County t o c o n s i d e r any 
c r i t e r i a o the r than those s p e c i f i c a l l y enumerated. A c c e p t a n c e of 
t h e c o u n t y ' s a rgument t h a t t h e t e rm " c o n s i d e r a t i o n " a l lows the 
county to cons ide r any and a l l f a c t o r s in s e l e c t i n g an employee 
fo r a RIF s e p a r a t i o n of n e c e s s i t y r e q u i r e s t h i s Court to r e w r i t e 
t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s . T h u r s t o n s u b m i t s , however , t h a t 
t h i s Cour t has no o b l i g a t i o n to a s c e r t a i n and then d r a f t for the 
County an expanded or arguably more comprehens ive RIF p o l i c y and 
p r o c e d u r e where t h e l a n g u a g e of t h e p r e s e n t RIF p r o v i s i o n s a r e 
c l e a r and unequivocable and p a r t y i n t e n t can be r e a d i l y o b t a i n e d 
from t h e f a c e of t h e d o c u m e n t . Rules of c o n t r a c t c o n s t r u c t i o n 
suppor t T h u r s t o n ' s argument: 
Nagle v . Club F o n t a i n b l e u , 17 Utah2d 125, 405 P.2d 346 
(Utah 1965) (Where the i n t e n t and purpose of a c o n t r a c t document 
can be a s c e r t a i n e d on i t s f a c e , t he document should be enforced 
in accordance with i t s s u b s t a n c e . ) 
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C o m m e r c i a l B u i l d i n g Corp , v B l a i r , 565 P. 2d 776 (Utah 
1977) ( A l l words used by t h e p a r t i e s in a c o n t r a c t m u s t , i f 
p o s s i b l e , be given t h e i r usua l and o rd ina ry meaning and e f f e c t . ) 
Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1972) 
( P a r t i e s may be bound by t h e l a n g u a g e they d e l i b e r a t e l y use in 
t h e i r c o n t r a c t s , i r r e s p e c t i v e t h a t s u c h l a n g u a g e a p p e a r s t o 
r e s u l t in improvidence.) 
Rio Algon Corp . v . Gimco L t d . , 618 P.2d 497 (Utah 1987) 
(A c o u r t w i l l not make a b e t t e r c o n t r a c t fo r t h e p a r t i e s than 
they have made for t hemse lves . ) 
Crowther v . C a r t e r , 767 P. 2d 129 (UtahApp.1989) (Whether 
ambiguity e x i s t s in a c o n t r a c t i s a ques t ion of law. ) 
C .J . Rea l ty , I n c . v . W i l l e y , 758 P.2d 923 (UtahApp.1988) 
( T h e m e r e f a c t t h a t p a r t i e s t o a c o n t r a c t u r g e d i v e r s e 
d e f i n i t i o n s of c o n t r a c t t e r m i n o l o g y i s not s u f f i c i e n t to r e n d e r 
the terminology ambiguous.) 
S e a r s v . R i e n e r s m a , 655 P .2d 1105 (U tah 1982) (Any 
u n c e r t a i n t y with r e s p e c t to the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a c o n t r a c t should 
be reso lved a g a i n s t the p a r t y who has drawn the agreement . ) 
Wel l s Fargo Bank, N.A. v . Midwest R e a l t y and F i n a n c e , 
I n c . , 544 P. 2d 882 (Utah 1975) ( In dea l ing with a document which 
i s ambiguous or u n c e r t a i n , the gene ra l r u l e i s t h a t t h e document 
shou ld be c o n s t r u e d s t r i c t l y a g a i n s t the pa r ty who wrote i t and 
favorably to the o the r p a r t y a g a i n s t whom t h e c o n t r a c t l anguage 
has been invoked.) 
_ 1 *7_ 
Col lom a c t e d i n d e r o g a t i o n of t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s 
b e c a u s e he c o n s i d e r e d f a c t o r s i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e e n u m e r a t e d 
c r i t e r i a of l e n g t h of s e r v i c e a n d / o r i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e . 
T h u r s t o n ' s d i s m i s s a l s h o u l d be s e t a s i d e w i t h T h u r s t o n r e i n s t a t e d 
t o f u l l e m p l o y m e n t c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e summary judgment motion 
f i l e d by T h u r s t o n . T h i s c a s e s h o u l d be r e m a n d e d t o t h e d i s t r i c t 
c o u r t f o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e b a c k p a y a w a r d a n d t h e 
r e i n s t a t e m e n t o f b e n e f i t s l o s t by T h u r s t o n f rom t h e w r o n g f u l 
d i s m i s s a l . 
POINT 2 
THE COUNTY'S CONSIDERATION OF THURSTON'S INDIVIDUAL 
JOB PERFORMANCE UNDER THE REDUCTION IN FORCE 
PROVISIONS OF THE COUNTY'S POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 
MANUAL VIOLATED THURSTON'S ADMINISTRATIVE DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS IN THAT THE COUNTY CITED MULTIPLE 
ALLEGED INSTANCES OF DEFICIENT JOB PERFORMANCE 
FOR WHICH THURSTON HAD NEVER BEEN DISCIPLINED 
UNDER THE DISCIPLINARY ACTION PROVISIONS OF THE 
MANUAL. 
The County maintains that a controlling consideration for 
Thurston's dismissal derives from nine occasions, occuring within 
an approximate five year period, when Thurston's job performance 
was unacceptable. Four of these occasions fall within the 
administrative jurisdiction of the Manual. Collora's testimony 
before the Box Elder County Board of Appeals established that 
Thurston's performance on each occasion fell below minimum levels 
of acceptable job performance as opposed to being marginally 
acceptabe but otherwise beyond disciplinary action. 
-1 Q-
Sect ion V of the County 's Manual p rov ides t h a t : 
V, D i s c i p l i n a r y ac t i on - Ca t ego r i e s of Rule 
I n f r a c t i o n . 
D i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
supe rv i so ry personnel when n e c e s s a r y . Measures 
a v a i l a b l e a r e o r a l d i s c u s s i o n , w r i t t e n repr imands , 
suspens ion , demotion and t e r m i n a t i o n . All such 
measures s h a l l follow the p r e s e n t a t i o n of the 
c h a r g e ( s ) to the employee acknowledged by d a t e 
and w r i t t e n s i g n a t u r e and given to the Office of 
Personnel Management . . . (Rec. a t 7 8 - 8 1 , Manual). 
" G r o s s n e g l e c t of d u t y o r r e f u s a l t o comply w i t h l a w f u l 
i n s t r u c t i o n s . . . " , " i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n " and " i n c o m p e t e n c y " and 
" i n e f f i c i e n c y in t h e pe r fo rmance of job d u t i e s . . . " are each 
defined i n f r a c t i o n s under Section V of the Manual. 
The s e v e r i t y of c r i t i c i s m u s e d by C o l l o m t o d e s c r i b e 
T h u r s t o n ' s i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o k e d t h e 
Manual 's d i s c i p l i n a r y ac t i on s t a n d a r d s . C o l l o m ' s d e s c r i p t i o n of 
T h u r s t o n ' s j o b p e r f o r m a n c e was synonomous wi th t h e M a n u a l ' s 
i n f r a c t i o n s t a n d a r d s o f " g r o s s n e g l e c t o f d u t y " , 
" i n s u b o r d i n a t i o n " , " i n c o m p e t e n c y " , " i n e f f i c i e n c y " , o r 
" i n a t t e n t i v e n e s s to work". 
N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g C o l l o m ' s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of T h u r s t o n ' s 
p e r f o r m a n c e , Collom a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t he never i n v o k e d h i s 
s u p e r v i s o r y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to d i s c i p l i n e Thur s ton w i t h i n t h e 
t i m e f r a m e t h a t e a c h a l l e g e d i n f r a c t i o n o c c u r r e d . C o l l o m , 
m o r e o v e r , n e v e r d i s c l o s e d t o T h u r s t o n t h a t any a s p e c t of 
T h u r s t o n ' s i n d i v i d u a l performance was unaccep tab le u n t i l T h u r s t o n 
q u e r i e d Collom on December 16 and December 19, 1988 about why he 
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had b e e n s e l e c t e d f o r d i s m i s s a l . T h u r s t o n ' s a n n u a l j o b 
performance a p p r a i s a l s c o n t a i n e d no ment ion of any of t h e n i n e 
i n f r a c t i o n ca tegory c i rcumstances c i t e d by Collora. 
The C o u n t y a r g u e s t h a t " i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e " 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s u n d e r t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF p r o v i s i o n s h a v e no 
a p p l i c a t i o n or r e l e v a n c e t o t h e M a n u a l ' s d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n 
p r o v i s i o n s . The C o u n t y ' s a rgument i s p r o v i s i o n a l l y c o r r e c t for 
those c i rcumstances where the i n d i v i d u a l pe r fo rmance c r e d e n t i a l s 
of two or more employees s u b j e c t to s e p a r a t i o n under a RIF a c t i o n 
a re being compared and the c o v e r e d c o n d u c t of each employee has 
not been s u b j e c t to t h e d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n p r o v i s i o n s of t h e 
Manual. T h u r s t o n ' s i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e , however , was n e v e r 
compared by Collom wi th t h a t of any o t h e r County Road Department 
e m p l o y e e . I n s e l e c t i n g T h u r s t o n f o r s e p a r a t i o n , C o l l o m 
" c o n s i d e r e d n i n e o c c a s i o n s w i t h i n a f i v e y e a r p e r i o d where he 
deemed t h a t T h u r s t o n ' s p e r f o r m a n c e had f a l l e n b e l o w minimum 
l e v e l s of a c c e p t a b l e performance. 
C o l l o m ' s f a i l u r e to i n v o k e t h e M a n u a l ' s d i s c i p l i n a r y 
a c t i o n p r o v i s i o n s a g a i n s t Thurston for perce ived i n f r a c t i o n l e v e l 
performance and to f u r t h e r d e l a y t h e d i s c l o s u r e of any of t h e s e 
a l l e g e d i n f r a c t i o n s t o T h u r s t o n u n t i l t h e two December , 1988 
meet ings between him and Thurston v i o l a t e d T h u r s t o n ' s c o n t r a c t u a l 
due p r o c e s s g u a r a n t e e s unde r t h e Manual in t h a t T h u r s t o n was 
e f f e c t i v e l y d e p r i v e d of h i s c o n t r a c t u a l r i g h t t o p r o t e c t h i s 
employee i n t e r e s t s and employment r e c o r d t h r o u g h t h e M a n u a l ' s 
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g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s . The n i n e i n s t a n c e s of u n a c c e p t a b l e work 
p e r f o r m a n c e r e l i e d upon by C o l l o m t o s e l e c t T h u r s t o n f o r 
d i s m i s s a l u n d e r t h e RIF a c t i o n were never d i s c l o s e d in t h e i r 
e n t i r e t y u n t i l Collom t e s t i f i e d a t t he March 13, 1989 Box E l d e r 
County Board of Appeals h e a r i n g . 
The r e s u l t f o l l o w s t h a t Thurs ton was c o n f r o n t e d for the 
f i r s t t ime a t t he Board of Appea l s h e a r i n g w i th an employment 
r e c o r d a b o u t which he had no knowledge and which was in m a t e r i a l 
c o n f l i c t with h i s o f f i c i a l personne l f i l e . The C o u n t y ' s conduc t 
i r r e v o c a b l y p r e j u d i c e d T h u r s t o n by c o m p e l l i n g him to defend an 
employment r ecord o u t s i d e of t h e M a n u a l ' s g r i e v a n c e p r o c e d u r e s 
upon which Thurs ton s h o u l d have been accorded a c o n t r a c t u a l due 
p r o c e s s r i g h t t o r e l y f o r t h e p r o t e c t i o n of h i s emp loymen t 
i n t e r e s t s . Thur s ton had been e f f e c t i v e l y t r i e d and c o n v i c t e d 
before he even knew t h a t h i s s u p e r v i s o r had placed him on t r i a l . 
The County c i t e s Ca ldwe l l v . Ford Bacon and D a v i s , Utah , 
I n c . , 777 P.2d 483 (Utah 1989) as precedent for i t s argument t h a t 
T h u r s t o n ' s " i n d i v i d u a l p e r f o r m a n c e " u n d e r t h e M a n u a l ' s RIF 
p r o v i s i o n s d id not r e q u i r e d i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n compliance with 
Sec t ion V of the Manual. Thurston submits t h a t Ca ldwel l does not 
s u p p o r t t h e C o u n t y ' s a r g u m e n t and t h a t t h e f a c t p a t t e r n and 
h o l d i n g in C a l d w e l l have no r e l e v e n c e to t he f a c t p a t t e r n and 
r u l e s of law a t i s s u e in t h i s a c t i o n . 
In C a l d w e l l , t h e p l a i n t i f f was i n v o l u n t a r i l y t e r m i n a t e d 
from e m p l o y m e n t a s a p a r t of a e m p l o y e r o r d e r e d R I F . The 
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e m p l o y e r ' s po l i cy governing invo lun ta ry employment s e p a r a t i o n was 
s e t f o r th wi th in two s e p a r a t e s e t s of p u b l i s h e d b u l l e t i n s . The 
f i r s t s e t of b u l l e t i n s governed d i scha rge for cause and provided 
t h a t an employee would no t be d i s c h a r g e d f o r c a u s e w i t h o u t t h e 
employer f i r s t i n s t i t u t i n g t h r ee p r o g r e s s i v e d i s c i p l i n e s t e p s and 
t h a t any e m p l o y e e d i s c h a r g e d f o r c a u s e would f o r f e i t a l l 
s e p a r a t i o n p a y . The s e c o n d s e t of b u l l e t i n s c o n t a i n e d t h e 
employer ' s announced r i g h t to t e rmina te any employee a t w i l l and 
w i t h o u t p r i o r wa rn ing in which even t the employer would r e c e i v e 
s e p a r a t i o n pay. The p l a i n t i f f had r e c e i v e d , a week p r i o r to h i s 
employment d i s c h a r g e , a g o o d - t o - e x c e l l e n t job performance r a t i n g 
and a pay r a i s e . 777 P.2d a t 484. The p l a i n t i f f ' s s e p a r a t i o n 
n o t i c e s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e a s o n f o r h i s t e r m i n a t i o n was a 
" r e d u c t i o n in f o r c e " . C a l d w e l l r e c e i v e d s e p a r a t i o n pay in 
a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e e m p l o y e r ' s b u l e t i n p r o v i d i n g t h a t i t could 
t e rmina t e any employee a t w i l l and without p r i o r n o t i c e f o r which 
s e p a r a t i o n pay would be r e c e i v e d . The p l a i n t i f f contended t h a t 
t h e e m p l o y e r b u l l e t i n s g o v e r n i n g d i s c h a r g e f o r c a u s e had 
n e c e s s a r i l y m o d i f i e d t h e a t w i l l c h a r a c t e r of h i s employment 
r e l a t i o n s h i p and t h o s e b u l l e t i n s u t i l i z e d by t h e e m p l o y e r t o 
t e r m i n a t e an employee w i t h o u t c a u s e and wi thou t n o t i c e but with 
s e p a r a t i o n pay. The Utah Supreme Court r e j e c t e d t h e p l a i n t i f f ' s 
a rgument h o l d i n g t h a t the p l a i n t i f f was p rope r ly t e rmina ted under 
c o n t r o l l i n g p r o v i s i o n s of t h e e m p l o y e r ' s b u l l e t i n which a l lowed 
i t t o t e r m i n a t e a t w i l l and w i t h o u t n o t i c e cond i t ioned upon i t s 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of s e p a r a t i o n pay. The Court h e l d : 
- 2 2 -
Paragraph 6(a) of bulletin No. 202 plainly permits 
"involuntary terminations" other than for cause, 
without notice so long as FB&D pays the terminated 
employee a specified separation pay fixed by 
reference to the length of time the employee had 
been with FB&D. A warning notice is required only 
when a discharge is for cause under bulletin No. 
902. Paragraph 6(b) of bulletin No. 202 further 
states that only an employee dismissed for cause 
forfeits separation pay. Caldwell was told that 
he was being discharged as a part of a reduction 
of force, and he received and negotiated a check 
for separation pay determined under paragraph No. 
6(b). This would make it appear that he was 
properly terminated under bulletin No. 202. . . 
(The Manual) plainly contemplataes that involuntary 
terminations other than those for cause may be made 
by FB&D and does not limit the reasons for which 
the employer may make them, and it certainly does 
not require that reductions in force be based on 
some arbitrary criteria. 777 P.2d at 486. 
The fact pattern in Caldwell has no application to the 
fact pattern in this action. The County's Manual and its RIF 
provisions set forth express criteria for implementing a 
reduction in force. Termination at will is not a component of 
the Manual's RIF procedures. 
The County's failure to abide by the disciplinary action 
provisions within its Manual should effectively preclude it, as a 
matter of law, from selecting Thurston for the RIF action where 
the "individual performance considerations" cited by Collom 
clearly constituted infraction conduct under the Manual's Section 
V disciplinary action provisions. The absence of any 
disciplinary action records within Thurston's official personnel 
file, the award to him of scheduled wage step increases and the 
absence of annual performance appraisals isolating infraction 
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level performance all mandate that the County be precluded from 
going behind Thurston's official personnel file, for the first 
time, on December 19, 1988, to after-the-fact rationalize that a 
reason for Thurston's termination qas nine separate occasions of 
work performance constituting infractions under Section V of the 
County's Manual. 
CONCLUSION 
Thurston's employment dismissal should be set aside as a 
matter of law with this case remanded to the district court for 
the purpose of establishing a back pay award and reinstating 
benefits lost by Thurston because of the unlawful dismissal. 
PHILIP C.1PATTI 
Attorney lor Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
December 14, 1989 Memorandum Decision of the 
First Judicial District Court for Box Elder 
County, Utah, the Honorable F.L. Gunnell, Judge . . . 25a 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, COUNTY OF BOX ELDER 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE W. THURSTON, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
Defendant 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Civil No. 890000165 
This matter came before the Court on Counter Motions for 
Summary Judgment. The Court having read the motions, supporting 
documents and affidavits and counter pleadings of the parties and 
having heard oral arguments now issues the following Memorandum 
Decision: 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The issue presented before the Court is whether the 
procedures followed by the County in a reduction in force issue were 
appropriate as applied to this Plaintiff. It being conceded by the 
parties that there was a reduction in force not only of the 
Plaintiff in this action but, other individuals as well. 
It is agreed by both parties that the relevant provision 
involved in this action is contained in the Box Elder County's 
Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual adopted April 26, 1988 and 
specifically # II F Reduction in Workforce . The revelant language 
is quoted in this opinion in total as follows: -When circumstances 
(such as lack of funds or lack of work) indicate that a reduction in 
force is needed, the Elected Official or Department Head shall lay 
off the necessary number of employees with consideration to length 
of service and/cr individual performance. 
Civil No. 890000166 
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This case hinges on the definition of the word 
"consideration" and the effect to be given thereto and its 
application in this fact situation. 
The Court is of the opinion that the discipline proceduresof 
the Personnel Policy and the reduction in force considerations are 
separate and distinct and have no relationship to each other and is 
not persuaded that any performance matter to be considered in a 
reduction in force setting must preliminarily have been considered 
in a disciplinary setting. The Court also notes that while it might 
have been advisable to consider any performance of the Plaintiff in 
this case in a relationship to other employee's, the Court finds 
that there is no legal precedent which mandates such a procedure and 
accordingly finds that the county is not obligated to do so. 
As to the interpretation of the word "consider", both parties 
have referred to the Chevron case in their briefs and the language 
of the Court therein. In the opinion of the Court, the critical 
language in that case is that the provisions of referring to 
consideration of these factors were given "merely as a guideline for 
management". It is also unrealistic in the view of the Court to 
assume that if the Courts can indicate as they did in the Chevron 
case, that no relative weight or value is assigned to any of the 
criteria including the fact that "they may not give any weight 
whatsoever if management deemed it inadvisable to do so", that 
thereby the County would be procluded from considering any other 
factors. In the view of the Court even though there may be some 
equitable reasons for weighting factors differently than the County 
may have done in this case, the status of the law is that in 
reduction in force provisions such as the one before the Court the 
employer is only required to consider and give such weight as they 
determine appropriate to the factors enumerated and that they are 
not precluded from considering other factors in addition to those 
enumerated The uncontroverted 
Civil No. 890000166 
Page 3 
affidavits of the County indicate that in fact the criteria were 
both considered, that there was concern expressed to the employee 
concerning his individual performance and that in addition to these 
factors, other factors were considered such as the opportunity for 
the employees to obtain outside employment if in fact due to the 
reduction in force he was terminated. 
Accordingly, for the reasons contained herein, the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted, there being no 
genuine issue of a material fact remaining and the Trial Setting in 
this matter is vacated. 
Counsel for Defendant to prepare an order for the Court 
consistant with this opinion and submit the same **o Counsel for 
Plaintiff for approval as to form. 
DATED this / ' day of December, 1989. 
F.L. GUNNELL 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
00024m 
January 2, 1990 Order of the First Judicial 
District Court for Box Elder County, Utah, 
The Honorable F.L. Gunnell, Judge 25b 
Dale J, Lambert, 1871 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
Jon Bunderson, 0487 
County Attorney 
Box Elder County 
One South Main 
Brigham City, UT 843 02 
Telephone: (801) 734-9464 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE W. THURSTON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOX ELDER COUNTY, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. 89 0000 166 
The Court having heard the oral arguments of counsel 
representing the plaintiff and the defendant, the motions, 
supporting documents, affidavits and other pleadings on file herein 
and good cause appearing therefor: 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted and 
plaintifffs Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby denied. 
Case No. 
M ! C R O f : L M £ D 
n_ 4\ d r. Soli No. _ C 3 . / / Ir i 
Consistent with this Order, plaintifffs Complaint is hereby 
dismissed with prejudice, ^ 
DATED this Ann day of December, *$&&$-. 
BY THE COURT: 
Phi l ip c . .Pa t t e r son 
Attorney f<b\r P l a i n t i f f 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
January 9, 1990 Notice of Entry of Judgment of 
the First Judicial District Court for Box 
Elder County, Utah 25c 
BRIGHAU DISTRICT 
^ ' 0 |fl53^ifS0 
Dale J. Lambert, 1871 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C, 
510 Clark Learning Building 
175 South West Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
Jon Bunderson, 0487 
County Attorney 
;• Box Elder County 
; One South Main 
1 Brigham City, UT 84 3 02 
! Telephone: (801) 734-9464 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ARCHIE W. THURSTON, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
; BOX ELDER COUNTY, ] 
! Defendant. ] 
l NOTICE OF ENTRY OF 
) JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 89 0000 166 
Pursuant to Rule 58A(d), defendant Box Elder County hereby 
;j gives notice that the Judgment in the captioned case was entered 
1 on January 2, 1990. 
DATED this t day of January, 1990. 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
Dale J. Zambert 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Case No. 
•JAJJ 1 0 1990 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this y day of January, 1990, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage 
prepaid to the following persons: 
Philip C. Patterson, Esq. 
Patterson & Poorman 
427 - 27th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401-4291 
, / - / ' ^ 
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Section 11(F). Reduction in Work Force, Box Elder 
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Vacat ion A f t e r 12 m o n t h s o f 
cont inuous p a r t - t i m e s e r v i c e , 
e l i g i b l e f o r t h e a v e r a g e d 
number of h o u r s worked p e r 
week. 
Sick Leave A v a i l a b l e a f t e r t h e 
second y e a r a c c r u e d a t t h e 
r a t e of 3.7 hours for every 80 
h o u r s worked b a s e d on t h e 
second year of s e r v i c e . 
Health Insurance Not paid by the County. 
Ret i rement S a m e a s f u l l - t i m e 
employees. 
Averaging below 24 hours per week 
Holidays None. 
Vacation A f t e r 1 2 m o n t h s 
con t inuous p a r t - t i m e s e r v i c e 
e l i g i b l e f o r t h e a v e r a g e 
number of h o u r s worked p e r 
week. 
Sick Leave Not available. 
Retirement Available after four 
months of part-time employment 
to those employees who 
consistently work at least 20 
hours per week. 
B
» Temporary Employee 
Employees working on a seasonal or temporary basis 
are considered to be temporary and are not eligible for 
benefits. Determination of temporary status shall be 
determined at the time of hire. 
P. Reduction in Work Force 
When circumstances (such as lack of funds or lack 
of work) dictate that a reduction in force is needed, 
the Elected Official or Department Head shall lay off 
4 
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the necessary number of employees with consideration to 
length of service and/or individual performance. 
III. JOB CLASSIFICATION AND WAGE SCALE 
A. Job Grades 
County j obs a r e c l a s s i f i e d based on va r ious 
fac tors such as s k i l l and education required, working 
c o n d i t i o n s , i n t e r n a l equi ty and external comparison. 
C lass i f i ca t ions are determined from information on job 
d e s c r i p t i o n s . When dut ies of a posi t ion change, the 
descr ip t ion sha l l be rewri t ten by the Elected Off icial 
or Department Head and p re sen t ed to the Personne l 
O f f i c e fo r r e v i e w and c o n s i d e r a t i o n of g r a d e 
adjustment within 30 days, with f ina l approval by the 
Commission. 
All job descript ions and c l a s s i f i ca t ions sha l l be 
reviewed a t l e a s t every t h r e e yea r s by the Elec ted 
O f f i c i a l s and Department Heads in coordination with 
Personnel Management. 
B. Wage Steps 
Each job c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s assigned a pay range 
with a s t a r t i n g rate and step increases . Advancement 
w i t h i n t h a t s t e p range i s based upon s a t i s f a c t o r y 
p e r f o r m a n c e by t h e e m p l o y e e a f t e r r e v i e w and 
recommendation from the Elected Official or Department 
Head to Personnel Management, with f i n a l approval of 
the Commission. Employees s t a r t i n g at Step 1 become 
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s h a l l be promoted to the new grade Step t h r e e 
(3) and then advance to Step four (4) in s i x 
m o n t h s , w i t h a o n e s t e p i n c r e a s e i n 
acco rdance w i t h p a r a g r a p h ( 3 ) , Sub T i t l e : 
Wage S t e p s , r e f e r r e d to on pages 5 and 6. 
2 . I f t h e c u r r e n t s a l a r y i s a t o r 
above the minimum r a t e in the new g rade , the 
employee s h a l l be promoted to the new grade 
two (2) s t e p s above the c u r r e n t pay. 
D. Demotions 
When an e m p l o y e e i s t r a n s f e r r e d t o a n o t h e r 
p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e same d e p a r t m e n t o r a n o t h e r 
department , the new r a t e of pay w i l l be based upon the 
grade for the new job and not upon the p rev ious grade 
of the employee. 
E. Termination and Resignation 
A minimum of two weeks n o t i c e of i n t e n d e d 
t e r m i n a t i o n i s recommended of a l l employees to or by 
the County. The County r e se rves the r i g h t t o t e rmina te 
employment dur ing the e v a l u a t i o n per iod wi thout c a u s e . 
An e x i t i n t e r v i e w w i l l be r e q u i r e d i f e i t h e r p a r t y 
d e s i r e s . 
V. DISCIPLINARY ACTION - CATEGORIES OP RULE INFRACTIONS 
A. D i s c i p l i n a r y a c t i o n i s the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of 
s u p e r v i s o r y p e r s o n n e l when n e c e s s a r y . Measures 
a v a i l a b l e are o r a l d i s c u s s i o n s , w r i t t e n reprimands, 
s u s p e n s i o n , d e m o t i o n and t e r m i n a t i o n . A l l such 
measures s h a l l fo l low the presentat ion of the charge(s) 
to the employee acknowledged by date and wri t ten 
s ignature , and given to the Office of Personnel 
9 
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Management. 
CATEGORY 1 - Infractions that may result in an 
employee discussion or written reprimand. Termination 
or suspension can occur under Category 1, if the 
severity of the violation warrants such action. 
CATEGORY 2 - Infractions that will result in a 
written reprimand and could result in disciplinary 
suspension or termination. 
Some rules of conduct may apply to either 
category. A supervisor's determination of the category 
for which discipline is recommended will include 
consideration of the seriousness of the violationf the 
employee's past record, and extenuating circumstances. 
RULES OP CONDUCT: 
1. Gross neg lec t of duty or r e fusa l to comply 
w i t h l a w f u l i n s t r u c t i o n u n l e s s s u c h 
i n s t r u c t i o n i s i n j u r i o u s to the employee's or 
genera l p u b l i c ' s h e a l t h or s a f e t y ; (1) and (2) 
2 . I n s u b o r d i n a t i o n ; (1) and (2) 
3 . Convict ion of a felony while an employee of 
the County; (2) 
4 . I n d u l g i n g i n o f f e n s i v e conduct or us ing 
o f fens ive language; (1) 
5 . D e l i b e r a t e or c a r e l e s s conduct endangering 
the s a f e t y of the employee or e m p l o y e e s ; (1) 
and (2) 
6 . I n d u c i n g o r a t t e m p t i n g t o i n d u c e any 
employee in the s e r v i c e of the County to commit 
an u n l a w f u l a c t i n v i o l a t i o n of C o u n t y 
r e g u l a t i o n s , o f f i c i a l p o l i c i e s or depar tmenta l 
o r d e r ; (2) 
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7 . Using or t h r e a t e n i n g or a t t empt ing to use 
pe r sona l or p o l i t i c a l in f luence in an e f f o r t t o 
s e c u r e s p e c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n a s a County 
employee; (1) and (2) 
8 . I n c o m p e t e n c y and i n e f f i c i e n c y in t h e 
pe r fo rmance of job d u t i e s r e s u l t i n g i n an 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y r a t i n g of p e r f o r m a n c e 
e v a l u a t i o n s ; (1) and (2) 
9 . C a r e l e s s n e s s or n e g l i g e n c e wi th County 
monies or p rope r ty ; (2) 
10 . Theft or i n t e n t i o n a l d e s t r u c t i o n of County 
p r o p e r t y ; (2) 
1 1 . I n t e n t i o n a l f a l s i f i c a t i o n of p e r s o n n e l 
r e c o r d s , time r e p o r t s or o the r County r e c o r d s ; 
(2) 
12 . Being under t h e i n f l u e n c e of i n t o x i c a n t s 
of mind, or body impair ing drugs while on du ty ; 
(2) 
13 . S leeping on duty except as provided for in 
o f f i c i a l County r e g u l a t i o n s ; (2) 
14. Excessive absenteeism and/or t a r d i n e s s ; (1) 
15 . Horseplay and r e l a t e d k i n d s of a c t i v i t y ; 
(1) 
16. V i o l a t i n g a sa fe ty ru l e or p r a c t i c e ; (1) 
17. Smoking in posted or u n a u t h o r i z e d a r e a s ; 
(1) 
1 8 . F a i l u r e t o r e p o r t t o work w i t h o u t 
n o t i f i c a t i o n t o t h e E l e c t e d O f f i c i a l or 
Department Head, u n l e s s i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o 
give such n o t i c e ; (1) and (2) 
19 . I n a t t e n t i v e n e s s to work, f a i l i n g to s t a r t 
work a t the d e s i g n a t e d t i m e , q u i t t i n g work 
e a r l y or l e a v i n g e m p l o y e r ' s p r e m i s e s dur ing 
working hours wi thout a u t h o r i z a t i o n from the 
E l e c t e d O f f i c i a l o r D e p a r t m e n t Head or 
Management; (1) and (2) 
2 0 . V e n d i n g , s o l i c i t i n g o r c o l l e c t i n g 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s on the employer ' s time or 
premises without proper a u t h o r i z a t i o n ; (1) and (2) 
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21. Misuse of sick leave; (1) 
22. Violation of County Policy. (1) and (2) 
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE 
A. Policy 
I t i s the County 's po l icy to ad jus t employees1 
grievances promptly and f a i r l y . Employees who have 
grievances created by work s i tua t ions have the r ight to 
submit such g r ievances for o rder ly d i s p o s i t i o n . A 
grievance may ex is t when an employee feels d i s s a t i s f i e d 
with some aspec t of h i s / h e r employment over which 
he /she has no c o n t r o l and for which he / she des i r e s 
remedial ac t ion . 
B. Explanation of Rules 
All employees a re free to present complaints or 
grievances to the i r superv isor and s h a l l be assured 
freedom from d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , coe rc ion , r e s t r a i n t or 
r e p r i s a l . A l l employees have the r i g h t t o be 
r ep resen ted by anyone they choose at any step of the 
procedure. The employee and/or his/her representa t ive 
may use a reasonable pa r t of t h e i r working day to 
gather f a c t s , with a 24-hour not i f ica t ion to supervisor 
to gather f a c t s . The time l imi ts which are o u t l i n e d 
below are approximate and may be extended for log ica l 
and reasonable s i tua t ions by mutual consent. 
C. Steps in The Procedure 
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1. The employee, with a complaint or grievance, 
reports orally to his/her immediate supervisor clearly 
identifying the problem and suggesting possible 
solutions. If the situation is not resolved, an appeal 
to the next level of supervision is available. 
2. The employee presents his/her grievance in 
writing on official County Form(s) for the next level 
of supervision. After investigation and written 
response by the Elected Official or Department Head, if 
the grievance is not resolved, the appeal is for the 
next level (Office of Personnel Management) for review, 
coordination, and recommendation. 
3. The employee may go further with his/her 
appeal by presenting it in writing on official County 
Form(s) to the Commissioner over the department, along 
with recommendations for solution. 
D. Time Limits for Bach Step 
1. All grievances shall be mentioned within five 
(5) working days after they occur in order for 
consideration. The supervisor has five (5) working 
days to report an answer back to the employee. 
2. The employee, after receiving an answer back 
from his/her immediate supervisor has five (5) working 
days to appeal to the Elected Official or Department 
Head if he/she is not satisfied with the results. The 
Elected Official or Department Head has five (5) 
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working days to report back to the employee. 
3. The employee, after receiving an answer back 
from his/her Elected Official or Department Head has 
five (5) working days to appeal to the Personnel 
Director if he/she is not satisfied with the results. 
The Personnel Director has five (5) working days to 
report back to the employee. 
4. After receiving an answer back from the 
Elected Official or Department Head level and Personnel 
Management level, (within five (5) working days) if 
still not satisfied with the results, the employee has 
five (5) working days within which to appeal to the 
Commissioner. The Commissioner has twenty (20) working 
days in which to answer the employee. 
5. If still unsatisfied, the employee may appeal 
to a Board of Appeals with written statement on 
official County form(s) and copies of supporting 
information. The Board of Appeals consists of two 
Commissioners and one employee. The two Commissioners 
will be neutral of the department in which the 
grievance occurred and one employee to be selected by 
the County Employee Committee from another department 
located in another area not associated in any way with 
the affected employee. They shall convene a recorded 
hearing within ten (10) working days. 
At the hearing the employee or representative 
14 
shall first establish the basis of the grievance. All 
grievances must be documented in writing. Parties to 
the grievance may call witnesses who shall be sworn in. 
The Board shall receive all evidence and may ask 
questions and gather relevant information as it deems 
appropriate. They shall render a written decision to 
the employee within five (5) working days of the 
conclusion of the hearing. Their decision shall be 
final. 
VII. WORK POLICIES 
A. Work Hours 
Eight hours shall constitute a normal work day. 
Forty hours shall constitute the basic work week except 
where the nature of the employment requires alternative 
scheduling. 
B. Overtime - See Further Explanation Under Fair 
Labor Standards Act on Pages 26-31 
All overtime must be authorized by the 
Elected Official or Department Head. 
Authorized overtime will be paid at regular rates 
except where the State and Federal laws mandate 
otherwise. Overtime shall be authorized when a deputy 
is required to be in court when they are normally off 
duty, when an employee is required to work a shift to 
cover for another's sick or annual leave, and at other 
times authorized by the County Commission. 
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